its existing water supplies and the water use practices of the population. We then describe our research design and field procedures. The results of our analysis of the sample population's contingent valuation bids lead to general conclusions and remarks on policy implications of the research.
The Study Area
In August 1986 the research team conducted a contingent valuation survey and source observations in Laurent, a village in southern Haiti. One reason that southern Haiti was selected as the research area was that the United States Agency for International Development was funding a rural water supply project there. The project was designed to provide services to about 160,000 individuals in 40 towns and villages. The project was executed by CARE, which as the implementing agency was responsible for site selection, construction, and community organization. The CARE project's standard village water supply project was a gravity-fed system supplied with water captured from a mountain spring, feeding a few public standposts in a rural community. CARE provided experienced enumerators for our household surveys, logistic support, and valuable advice on a wide range of issues, from questionnaire design and translation to data on local water use customs. The affiliation of our research effort with the ongoing CARE project provided us with access to villages and justified our presence to the local population. 5 The village of Laurent is located about 15 kilometers from Les Cayes, the provincial capital of southern Haiti. The population of Laurent is about 1,500. The region is mountainous, with numerous streams draining into the Caribbean Sea. The rainy seasons are OctoberJanuary and May-June; our study was conducted during the middle of the July-September dry season.
The population of Laurent consists primarily of small farmers who cultivate sorghum, beans, corn, rice, manioc, sweet potatoes, plantains, yams, coconuts, mangos, and vetiver (a crop used in the production of essential oils for perfume). Few people have regular wage employment, and remittances from relatives and friends living abroad or in Port-au-Prince are common. Eighty percent of the population of Haiti are illiterate; the illiteracy rate in our study area is probably even higher. Malnourishment is widespread among children in Laurent. The typical family lives in a three-room mud house with plastered walls and a thatched or tin roof.
Water Sources and Water Use Patterns and Customs
Inhabitants of Laurent have access to several sources of fresh water. There are seven sources within approximately 2 kilometers of most of the population: one protected well and six springs in dry river beds.
The springs provide only modest amounts of water, and individuals often wait more than an hour to draw supplies. The average 3-kilometer round trip to a water source can sometimes take several hours.
The population of Laurent expresses strong preferences for clean drinking water and sometimes will walk considerable distances past alternative sources to collect drinking water from sources that are considered pure. Water for drinking and cooking is usually collected by women and children and carried home in relatively standard-size containers (about 20 liters for adults). Although children under 5 years old are usually bathed at home in basins, adults and older children have a strong preference for bathing in rivers. Clothes washing is usually done in rivers. Some individuals actually pay for public transport to make the roughly 10-kilometer round trip to the nearest river in order to do laundry.
Research Design
Our research design was developed to test whether contingent valuation surveys could be used to estimate water demand relationships suggested by consumer demand theory, and thus used reliably to estimate individuals' willingness to pay for improved water services. Economic theory suggests that an individual's demand for a good is a function of the price of the good, prices of substitute and complementary goods, the individual's income, and the individual's tastes, usually measured by the individual's socioeconomic characteristics. In CARE's water supply project, the characteristics of the good-public standposts or private connections-are the same for everyone. There is no volumetric charge for water from public standposts; an individual can use as much water as desired. Whether or not a household demands water from the public water system thus depends on the price charged for access to the new system or for participation in the project. If the charge is higher than a given household's maximum willingness to pay (WTP), the household will elect not to use the new water system. Maximum willingness to pay will vary from household to household and should be a function of all of the variables in the demand function except the price of the good itself. The households' WTP bids should thus be positively related to income, the cost of obtaining water from existing sources, and the education of household members, and negatively correlated with the individual's perception of the quality of water at the traditional source used before the construction of the improved water supply system. We would hypothesize that the WTP bids of women respondents would be higher than those of men because women carry most of the water, but alternative interpretations are certainly possible.6
Our research design attempted to test whether WTP bids are systematically related to the variables suggested by economic theory. If the variation in bids cannot be explained by such variables, three logical explanations can be offered. First, economic theory may not be an appropriate conceptual framework for explaining the behavior and preferences involved. Second, economic theory may be correct, but the contingent valuation method may not be a sound method for collecting information to estimate the water demand relationships suggested by such theory. Third, errors in execution of the research, such as poor questionnaire design, could lead to invalid inferences about the relationship between the WTP bids and the independent variables.
Because contingent valuation surveys have seldom been attempted in developing countries, our research design was constructed to test for the existence and magnitude of several types of threats to the validity of the survey results. The major problem with the contingent valuation method is that for a variety of reasons, respondents may not answer willingness-to-pay questions accurately and thus not reveal their "true" willingness to pay.7 The question format itself may affect the bids.8 In our pretest of the questionnaire we tried different ways of asking the willingness-to-pay questions.
We tried both open-ended, direct questions-for example, "What is the maximum you would be willing to pay per month to have a public standpost near your house?"-and two forms of bidding games in which we asked a series of yes-no questions-for example, "Would you be willing to pay $X per month for a public standpost near your house?" The Appendix presents an example of the sequence of questions used in one of these bidding games.
We also attempted to test for the existence and magnitude of three types of biases in contingent valuation surveys that have been of particular concern in the literature: strategic bias, starting point bias, and hypothetical bias.
Strategic Bias
Strategic bias may arise when an individual thinks he may influence an investment or policy decision by not answering the interviewer's questions truthfully. Such strategic behavior may influence an individual's answers in either of two ways. Suppose the individual is asked how much he would be willing to pay to have a public standpost near his house. If he thinks the water agency or donor will provide the service if the responses of individuals in the village are positive, but that someone else will ultimately pay for the service, he will have an incentive to overstate his actual willingness to pay. On the other hand, if he believes the water agency has already made the decision to install public standposts in the village, and the purpose of the survey is for the water agency to determine the amount people will pay for the service in order to assess charges, the individual will have an incentive to understate his true willingness to pay.
Most attempts to estimate strategic bias have been highly structured experiments in which one group of respondents is told one set of factors about a situation that minimizes their incentive for strategic behavior, and another group receives a different set that maximizes their incentives for strategic behavior.9 In fact most of the available evidence from the United States and Western Europe fails to support the hypothesis that individuals will act strategically in answering contingent valuation questions, but there is no evidence with respect to developing countries.
Because we were conducting our surveys within the context of CARE's ongoing rural water supply project, it was impossible to construct a counterfactual situation (it would have entailed deceiving the study population about CARE policies). We attempted instead to estimate the magnitude of strategic bias in the following way. We divided our study population into two groups. One group was read the following statement that was intended to minimize strategic bias:
Opening Statement A: I am going to ask you some questions in order to know if you or someone from your household would be willing to pay money to ensure that the CARE Potable Water Project will be successful in Laurent. We would like you to answer these questions at ease. There are no wrong answers.
The water system is going to be managed by a committee of people from Laurent. This committee will be chosen by the people of Laurent. CARE has decided to help Laurent by constructing a water system in this community. Your answers cannot change the fact that CARE has decided to build this water system. CARE never demands money from those people who collect water from public fountains. You will not have to pay money at the public fountains. We need you to tell the truth in order for CARE to construct the best water system for Laurent.
The second group was read another statement that was accurate but left more questions about the purpose of the study unanswered:
Opening Statement B: I am going to ask you some questions in order to know if you or someone from your household would be willing to pay money so that the CARE Potable Water Project will be successful in Laurent. The water system is going to be managed by a committee of people from Laurent. This committee will be chosen by the people of Laurent. The committee will decide the amount each household will have to pay to operate and maintain the water system. Our hypothesis was that if individuals acted strategically, then bids from those who received the second statement would be lower than bids from those who received the first, because the former would fear that a high bid would result in a higher charge by the community water committee.'o Starting-Point Bias In the bidding-game question format, the interviewer starts the questioning at an initial price. A respondent who is unsure of an appropriate answer and wants to please the interviewer may interpret this initial price as a clue as to the "correct" bid. Starting-point bias exists if this initial price affects the individual's final willingness to pay. To test for starting-point bias we distributed three different versions of our questionnaire, each with different initial prices in the bidding game. The questionnaires were randomly distributed in the sample population.
Hypothetical Bias
Hypothetical bias may arise from two kinds of reasons.11 First, the respondent may not understand or correctly perceive the characteristics of the good being described by the interviewer. This has been a particular problem when the contingent valuation method has been used to measure individuals' willingness to pay for changes in environmental quality because it may be difficult for people to perceive what a change, for example, in sulfur dioxide or dissolved oxygen means in terms of air or water quality. This source of hypothetical bias is not likely, however, to be significant for most public services in developing countries. Many rural water systems have already been built in southern Haiti; our respondents were all familiar with public water fountains and private water connections and readily understood the possibility that their community would receive a new water system. Moreover, we showed each respondent two color photographs of public standposts CARE had built in nearby villages. Household members usually studied these with great interest. Second, it is often alleged, particularly in the context of developing countries, that individuals will not take contingent valuation questions seriously and will simply respond by giving whatever answer first comes to mind. Where this type of hypothetical bias is prevalent, bids will presumably be randomly distributed and not systematically related to household characteristics and other factors suggested by economic theory. Our test for hypothetical bias was thus the same as our test for the applicability of consumer demand theory: were bids systematically related to the variables suggested by economic theory?
Field Procedures Fieldwork in the village consisted of two parts: household surveys and source observations. Eight CARE health education promoters and two local college students were trained for 2 days to carry out the household interviews. Prior to field-testing the questionnaire, we held a "focus group" in which individuals from a nearby community discussed community water use practices and attitudes. Particular attention was paid in our focus group to household decision making on water-related matters and to community expectations about operation and maintenance costs. The focus group was not intended, however, to substitute for a pretest of the questionnaire. The Creole questionnaire was pretested extensively in a nearby village before the CARE enumerators were trained, and another day of pretesting was carried out by CARE staff after training. Because microcomputers were available, revisions to the questionnaire could be incorporated literally overnight, and new copies made for fieldwork the next day.
The majority of households in Laurent were interviewed. Enumerators were instructed to try to interview someone in every house. If no one was at home, a follow-up visit was usually arranged.
The household interview consisted of four sections. The first dealt with basic occupational and demographic data for the family members and summary information on where the family obtained its water. The second section consisted of additional questions on the location of each water source that the family used, perceptions of the water quality at each source, the average number of times each family member went to each source per day, and the number of containers they carried home (the enumerator asked to see the containers used to carry water and estimated their volume). In the third section of the questionnaire, the enumerator read one of the statements used to test for strategic bias and showed the respondent photographs of public standposts CARE had built in other villages. The respondent was then asked for (a) a WTP bid per month for public standposts (assuming no private connections) and (b) a private connection (assuming public standposts were already installed). The fourth section was a series of questions on the health and education of family members and the household's assets (such as whether the household had a radio or a kerosene lamp). The principal investigators and the enumerators had agreed that it was not possible to obtain accurate information on household income through interviews (in fact, the enumerators simply refused to ask either income or expenditure questions because of the antagonism such questions aroused). As a substitute, the enumerator recorded a series of observations about the construction of the house itself, such as whether the house was painted, whether the roof was straw or tin, and whether the floor of the house was dirt or cement.
A detailed map of the village was prepared that indicated the location of all houses and major structures, as well as all water sources. Enumerators who could read maps were given a copy of the village map and asked to assign a number to each household interviewed and to record that number on the map. The enumerator also gave each respondent a ribbon and an index card with the corresponding house-hold number on it and asked the respondent to wear the ribbon or bring the index card on a designated day to the water source used. Enumerators who could not read a map were given a set of ribbons with preassigned numbers, dropped at specific points in the villages, and instructed to interview households in clearly specified areas and assign a number to each household interviewed; one of the senior members of the research team then recorded on the map which households were located in the specified areas. Data from household interviews were generally entered into the microcomputer on the same day the interviews were conducted, and processed with dBase III programs. Summary statistics were continually compiled during the course of the fieldwork, and discrepancies in the data and problems with the survey implementation could be quickly detected.
The second part of the fieldwork consisted of observing the quantities of water collected by individuals at all the sources used by the population of the village. The objective of these observations was to verify the information individuals provided in household interviews on the sources they used and the quantities of water collected. Local residents were hired to serve as source observers; they were typically secondary school students on summer vacation. All source observers received one day of training in estimating the volumes of various containers and in recording data in their notebooks. Each time an individual arrived at a source, the source observer recorded household number, name, gender, relative age (adult or child), time of arrival, quantity of water carried away, and whether the individual bathed or did laundry. All sources were observed on the same day from sunrise to sunset. Two shifts of source observers were used for each source. The source observers were monitored closely by the principal investigators to ensure the quality of the data collected.
Analysis of the Source Observation Data
The analysis of the source-observation data for Laurent increased our confidence in the quality of the water-use data obtained from the household interviews. In Laurent we recorded data on 119 trips to water sources by individuals (or groups of individuals from the same household) who identified themselves to our source observers either by wearing a ribbon or displaying an index card with their household number. We compared the sources these individuals said they used for drinking and cooking in the interview with the source they actually went to on the day of our source observations. Out of the 119 observations, the interview responses were consistent with the source observations for 101 households (85%). In the econometric analysis of the contingent valuation bids, we used the water source selection data from the household interviews in order to calculate the distance from the household to its primary source of drinking and cooking water. 
Analysis of the Contingent Valuation Bids
In Laurent, 170 questionnaires were completed out of approximately 225 households in the village. Our impression from sitting in on many of the household interviews is that respondents took the contingent valuation questions, and indeed the entire interview, quite seriously. Fourteen percent of the households gave an answer of "I don't know" in response to the WTP question for public standposts; there was a 25% nonresponse rate for the WTP question for private connections. The mean of the bids in Laurent for the public standposts, 5.7 gourdes per month (US$1.14; US$1.00 = 5 gourdes) seemed realistic to us. In our opinion, we never received wildly unrealistic or "protest" bids. Based on the pretest, we felt that the bidding-game question format worked better than the direct, open-ended questions. People generally felt more comfortable with the bidding games, and, in fact, our enumerators remarked that the bidding game format was very familiar and easily understood because it was similar to the ordinary kind of bargaining that goes on in local markets of rural Haiti. Hence in Laurent we used only the bidding-game question format. In this section we discuss the results of the statistical analysis of the data obtained from the household surveys in Laurent. Table 1 presents the results of our tests for strategic bias for the WTP questions both for public standposts and private connections. The 150 total re- sponses for public standposts were relatively evenly divided between statement A (77 responses) and statement B (73 responses), as were those for the private connections. As anticipated, for respondents who received statement A, the mean bids both for public standposts and private connections were higher than for those who received statement B, but the difference is not statistically significant. On the basis of this test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that respondents were not acting strategically when they answered the WTP questions. Table 2 presents the results of a similar statistical test for startingpoint bias. If starting-point bias were a problem, we would expect that the low starting point (2 gourdes for public standposts; 5 gourdes for private connections) would result in a lower bid, and that the high starting point (7 gourdes for public standposts; 15 gourdes for private connections) would result in higher bids. The mean bids in table 2 do not appear to vary systematically with the starting point. The null hypothesis that the three samples are from the same population (that there is no difference in the responses from individuals who received different starting points) cannot be rejected, although the confidence intervals are wide.
On the basis of these results, there was no reason to attempt to adjust the WTP bids for strategic or starting-point bias. The mean of WTP bids for the public standposts was 5.7 gourdes per household per month. Assuming an average annual household income in Laurent of 4,000 gourdes (US$800), the mean bid is about 1.7% of household income and is significantly lower than the 5% rule of thumb often used in rural water-supply planning for maximum "ability to pay" for public standposts. The mean of WTP bids for private connections, 7.1 gourdes, was not much higher (2.1% of household income), but these bids are based on the assumption that the public standposts are already in place.
We next modeled the variations in the bids for public standposts and private connections as a function of the variables that were the primary focus of our research design. To measure income we developed an ordinal measure of the value of household assets, based on eight questions and observations about the quality of housing construction and household possessions (WLTH), and supplemented it with two other indicators of income: (1) whether the household received remittances from relatives living abroad and (2) the occupations of the principal members of the household. In the model remittance data were simply treated as a dummy variable (FINC). Occupation data were used to group households into two categories (farmers and nonfarmers) and were also represented by a dummy variable (IOCP). Education was measured as the sum of the years of school of up to two adults in the household (HHED). From the village map we measured the distance of each household to its drinking water source (DIST); these distances served as a measure of the cost of obtaining water from the existing source, which we viewed in the model as the "price" of the close substitute of the improved water service. Our measure of water quality (QULT) was based on the respondent's answers to seven questions concerning taste, odor, healthfulness, reliability, color, dirt, and conflict (quarrels) at the source.
Although the value households place on the proposed water system is a continuous variable, we believe the most reliable data generated from the bidding game are the set of yes/no responses to questions about specific, discrete prices. Thus, the observed dependent variable obtained from the bidding game procedure is not the maximum amount the household would be willing to pay but, rather, an interval within which the "true" willingness to pay falls. Linear regression is not an appropriate procedure for dealing with such an ordinal dependent variable because the assumptions regarding the specification of the error term in the linear model will be violated.12 We have therefore used an ordered probit model, discussed below, to explain the variations in WTP bids.
Let Vh be the maximum willingness to pay of household h for the proposed water system. Based on consumer demand theory, we hypothesize that Vh is a function of the attributes of the new and existing water sources and the household's socioeconomic characteristics Vh = a + XhB + eh,
where Xh is a vector of the household's characteristics and the attributes of the sources, a and B are parameters of the model, and eh is a random term with a standard normal distribution. Since Vh is not observable from the bidding game, equation (1) 
Summary and Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that it is possible to do a contingent valuation survey among a very poor, illiterate population and obtain reasonable, consistent answers. There does not appear to be a major problem with either starting point or hypothetical bias. The evidence with regard to strategic bias is less conclusive, but neither the admit-tedly limited test for strategic bias nor the experience of the enumerators indicated that it was a problem. From this research we cannot, of course, judge whether individuals in the villages would in fact pay the amounts they indicated in the contingent valuation survey if a water agency actually tried to collect the money. To do so we would need to conduct a contingent valuation survey in a village before a water system is built, then resurvey after the system is completed and collection efforts are made, and compare the prior bids with actual behavior.
Nevertheless, we believe that the preliminary results of this research strongly suggest that contingent valuation surveys are a feasible method for estimating individuals' willingness to pay for improved water services in rural Haiti. This has important policy implications for rural water supply projects such as CARE's because it seems to show that going into a village and conducting a relatively simple household survey can yield reliable information on the population's willingness to pay for improved water services. The implications of these preliminary research findings are not, however, limited to the rural water sector. Our research suggests that contingent valuation surveys may prove to be a viable method of collecting information on individuals' willingness to pay for a wide range of public infrastructure projects and public services in developing countries.
